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FCC’S INDECENCY REGULATION: 
A Comparative Analysis of Broadcast 
and Online Media
Maria Fontenot, Ph.D.* 
Michael T. Martínez, Ph.D.**
Abstract
Lawmakers and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have 
implemented policies, many at the urging of special interest groups and par-
ents, aimed at restricting content on broadcast television and radio and the 
Internet in the interest of protecting children.  Through comparative analysis, 
this research studies the FCC broadcast regulations and online regulations to 
determine how indecency standards are applied in both mediums and whether 
there is common ground.  The study finds that the courts accepted arguments 
for broadcasting that resembled a public interest approach, but for the Internet, 
accepted arguments that included public interest and marketplace approaches.
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Introduction
One of the mysteries of the regulation of broadcast and online media 
is how the intent of the U.S. Constitution, so well developed and enforced in 
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the regulation of print media, has been neglected in the electronic revolution. 
Regulation is a natural response to new media.  Communications policy should 
promote and maintain competitive and efficient industry.1  However, with tech-
nology quickly developing, newer media are sometimes subjected to stricter 
control than older media.  This Article will address and analyze legislation, reg-
ulations, and federal case law concerning broadcast media and online content. 
It will also evaluate whether the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 
attempt at regulating indecency can ever withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
Regulation has become a response to perceived technical problems.  In 
his Technologies of Freedom, Ithiel de Sola Pool examined three recognized 
models of communications regulation: print, common carrier, and broadcast.2 
The print model, applicable to speech and the press, was based primarily on 
legal precedents that have guaranteed freedom of communication since the 
eighteenth century.  Pool wrote that the courts understand the press and have 
a long tradition of protecting it from government repression.  The courts rec-
ognized that in cases involving freedom of speech or of the press, the First 
Amendment must be interpreted with the broadest possible scope.
Far from the print model, the third domain of communications—broad-
casting—has been highly regulated by the U.S. Congress and the courts.  In 
the 1920s, the available frequencies for broadcasting appeared to have reached 
their limit.  Increasing the number of allocated frequencies, which was 89, 
would increase congestion and lead to increased signal interference.  There-
fore, based on the shortage of frequencies in the spectrum, Congress became 
convinced that frequency regulation was essential.  Broadcasters and reg-
ulators want to maintain their oligopoly.  As new, non-frequency broadcast 
communications arise, like cable television, the concern of scarcity or shortage 
of frequencies should lessen and thereby weaken, if not eliminate, arguments 
for broadcast regulation.  The scarcity argument offers the foundation for all 
areas of broadcast regulation.3  However, in the current technological envi-
ronment of cable, satellite, and online communications, Samoriski, Huffman, 
and Trauth claim that scarcity does not prevail.4  Former FCC Chairman Reed 
Hundt disagrees.  Hundt wrote that technological developments have strength-
ened the argument for regulation in areas such as indecency.5  He said that 
1 See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regula-
tion, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207 (1982); Philip M. Napoli, The Unique Nature of Communication 
Regulation: Evidence and Implication for Communication Policy Analysis, 43 J. Broad. 
and Electronic Media 565 (1999); Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 
(1983).
2 See Pool, supra note 1.
3 Id. at 193.
4 Jan H. Samoriski et al., The V-chip and Cyber Cops: Technology vs. Regulation, 2 Comm. 
L. & Pol’y 143 (1997).
5 Reed E. Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Televi-
sion Broadcasters?, 45 Duke L.J. 1089, 1119 (1996).
2019] FCC’S INDECENCy REGULATION 61
when FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was decided in 1978, the Court recognized 
that adults had sources other than the broadcast media for gaining access to 
indecent materials, so restrictions on broadcast media were not particularly 
burdensome.  At this time, there were no video stores and almost no premium 
cable channels.  Technology provided the market with more indecent speech as 
the number of premium cable channels increased over time, making it easier 
to justify regulation.6
A variety of media over the decades have been blamed for lowering the 
public’s cultural tastes, increasing rates of delinquency, contributing to moral 
deterioration, lulling the masses into political superficiality, and suppressing 
creativity.7  For over a decade, the Internet has faced those very concerns, 
prompting a wave of legislative and judicial activity.  The Internet has gen-
erated public anxiety concerning children8 since children tend to be early 
adopters and therefore are on the forefront of new technology use.9
Lawmakers and the FCC have implemented policies, many at the urging 
of special interest groups and parents, aimed at restricting content on broad-
cast television and radio and the Internet in the interest of protecting children. 
Such coercive efforts have raised serious First Amendment concerns.10  Some 
argued that if the FCC and Congress went along with suggestions made by 
strong special interest groups such as Action for Children’s Television (ACT), 
broadcasters’ freedom to create programs would be hindered.11  These same 
First Amendment issues have plagued online content.  Congress spent fifteen 
years drafting and passing regulation aimed at protecting children from harm-
ful and indecent content on the web.  Most of the proposed regulation was 
struck down by lower federal courts or the U.S. Supreme Court for violating 
the First Amendment.12 
Through a comparative analysis, this Article will study the FCC’s broad-
cast regulations and its online regulations to determine how indecency 
standards are applied in both media and whether there is common ground. 
The overarching questions that will guide the legal analysis are:
6 Id.
7 Melvin L. DeFleur & Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theories of Mass Communication (5th 
ed. 1989).
8 Myron Orleans & Margaret C. Laney, Children’s Computer Use in the Home, 18 Social 
Science Computer Review 56, 57 (2000).
9 See Sonia Livingstone, young People and the New Media (2002).
10 Christopher Stern, Kids TV Plan Spells Controversy for Hundt, 125 Broadcasting & 
Cable  43 (1995).
11 Robert Corn-Revere, Mixed Messages on the First Amendment, see id. at  43.
12 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft 2004]; United States 
v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) 
[hereinafter Ashcroft 2002]; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); ACLU v. Gonzalez, 478 
F. Supp. 2d 775, 821 (E.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d sub nom. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d 
Cir. 2008); ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
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1: Are the arguments for regulation equally applicable to broadcast radio or 
television and the Internet?
2: What direction should broadcast and Internet policy take with develop-
ing technology?
First, this Article will address the FCC’s evolution from the Pacifica stan-
dard to the Golden Globes Order.  Second, this Article will analyze legislation, 
regulations, and federal case law concerning online content.  Finally, this Arti-
cle will evaluate whether the FCC’s attempt at regulating indecency can ever 
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
I. Curbing Indecent Content on Broadcast Radio 
and Television
Per Sections 307 and 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, broadcast-
ers are to serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”13  The public 
interest prong has long been debated and tested, especially in content regula-
tion.  Content-based restrictions on broadcast radio and television must satisfy 
strict scrutiny to be declared constitutional.14  Strict scrutiny requires that a 
statute serve a compelling interest, be narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est, and be the least restrictive means of advancing that interest.15  In Ginsberg 
v. New York, the Supreme Court held that there is a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors.16
The Supreme Court has long recognized that each medium of expression 
presents unique First Amendment problems.  In Pacifica, the Court noted the 
uniquely pervasive presence of broadcast radio as part of the rationale for reg-
ulating that type of content.  At issue was whether a twelve-minute monologue 
titled “Filthy Words,” aired at two in the afternoon, was indecent within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both”).17  The Commission iden-
tified several words that referred to excretory or sexual activities or organs 
and stated that the repetitive and deliberate use of such words in an afternoon 
13 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2004); Communications Act of 1934, 47 
U.S.C. § 309 (2018). 
14 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1984); U.S. v. Playboy, 529 U.S. 
803, 811–13 (2000) (holding that regulation proscribing indecent content on cable televi-
sion was content-based restriction of speech subject to strict scrutiny); Sable Commc’ns 
v. FCC, 429 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that indecency regulation of telephone mes-
sages was content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 868 (1997) (holding that indecency regulation of the Internet was a content-based 
restriction subject to strict scrutiny).
15 Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
16 Ginsberg v. State of N.y., 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
17 FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 738–39 (1978).
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broadcast for which children are in the audience was patently offensive.  In a 
5–4 decision, the Court agreed with the FCC’s determination that the broadcast 
was indecent.  Also, the Court said, “[t]he law generally speaks to channeling 
behavior more than actually prohibiting it.”18  Channeling indecent content to 
times of the day during which children are less likely to be in the audience can 
be a less restrictive means of regulating indecent speech.
The channeling method was later used in television through the work of 
Action for Children’s Television (ACT), a special interest group that wanted 
better programming and fewer commercials during children’s programs.  ACT 
also wanted quality media content for children and as much regulation of inde-
cent speech as the Constitution allowed.19  The group fought for a safe harbor 
to shield minors from indecent radio and television programs by restricting 
the hours within which they may be broadcast.  After eight years of litigation, 
a constitutionally sound safe harbor time frame was established: 10:00 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m.20  It remains in effect today.
In addition to channeling, the courts have upheld the mandatory instal-
lation of V-chips on televisions with screens larger than thirteen inches to curb 
indecent content on television.21  A V-chip is a device that allows parents or 
caregivers to block television programming that is not suitable for children.  It 
works with the television ratings system: Programs are assigned a rating, allow-
ing parents or caregivers to block out programming with ratings they feel are 
not suitable for children.22  The Telecom Act was a major rewrite of the Com-
munications Act of 1934.  The 1996 act classified electronic media services into 
categories: broadcasting, cable, and common carrier.  Newer media and tech-
nologies, such as the Internet and World Wide Web, were also addressed in 
the 1996 act.  The act relaxed many rules and regulations that once prohib-
ited telephone companies, cable systems, and broadcasters from providing the 
same services.
In 2008, Congress passed the Child Safe Viewing Act, which “directed the 
FCC to study the existence and availability of advanced blocking technologies 
parents can use to protect children from indecent or objectionable video or 
audio programming.”23  The Commission examined current blocking technolo-
gies and ratings systems used in various electronic media, including television, 
cable and satellite, wireless devices, and the internet.  The FCC also encouraged 
18 Id. at 731.
19 Naeemah Clark, The Birth of an Advocacy Group, 30 Journalism Hist. 66 (2004).
20 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
21 Telecommunication Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56 (1956).
22 Federal Commc’ns Comm’n, Consumer Guide: The V-Chip: Options to Restrict What 
your Children Watch on TV (2017), https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/v-chip-
putting-restrictions-what-your-children-watch [https://perma.cc/RLT7-yW5G].
23 Id. 
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the development, deployment, and use of such technology.24  The Act only 
required the FCC to explore available technologies, not to make policy regu-
lating content. 
II. FCC v. Fox I and II
It took two Supreme Court cases to determine if the FCC’s Golden 
Globes Order, evolving from the Pacifica standard for fleeting expletives, was a 
violation of the First Amendment.
In a 1978 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the FCC interpreted the 
Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica narrowly to define indecent language as lan-
guage that is both repetitive and descriptive.25
In 1987 and 1988, the FCC’s interpretation of indecent language evolved 
beyond repetitive, but still “preserved the distinction between literal and 
non-literal (or ‘expletive’) uses of evocative language.”26
The FCC received complaints that KPFK-FM in Los Angeles aired two 
separate programs, “Shocktime America” and “Jerker,” that included sexually 
explicit language.27  In a 1987 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Com-
mission expanded their earlier narrow definition of comedian George Carlin’s 
seven words, described in Pacifica, to be used as “examples of, rather than a 
definitive list of, the kinds of words that when used in a patently offensive 
manner as measured by contemporary community standards applicable to the 
broadcast medium, constitute indecency.”28
In 1988, after the Commission expanded its definition of indecency, 
several broadcast entities and public interest groups, through three cases, chal-
lenged the definition of indecency as unconstitutionally vague.29  The District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals found that the FCC’s expanded definition of 
indecency was “virtually the same definition articulated in the order reviewed 
by the Supreme Court in the Pacifica case” and did not address whether the 
definition was not on its face unconstitutionally vague.30  Thus the D.C. Court 
of Appeals found that “under governing precedent, the FCC’s definition of 
indecent broadcast material, though vagueness is inherent in it, is not constitu-
tionally defective.”31
24 See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC 09-69, In the Matter of Implementation of the 
Child Safe Viewing Act (2009).
25 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 507 (2009) [hereinafter Fox I]; In Re Ap-
plication of WGBH Educ. Found. for Renewal of License for Noncommercial Educ. 
Station WGBH-TV, Bos., Mass., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978).
26 Id. at 507–08. 
27 In the Matter of Pacifica Found., Inc. d/b/a Pacifica Radio L.A., Cal. Licensee of 
 KPFK-FM L.A., Cal., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 2698, 2698 (1987). 
28 Id. at 2699.
29 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
30 Id. at 1339.
31 Id. at 1344.
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More than a decade later, FCC regulations emphasized that the full con-
text in which the expression appears must be taken into account in deciding 
whether a use is indecent.32
In 2004, the Commission broadened the scope of existing regulation 
and declared for the first time that a “nonliteral (expletive) use of the F- and 
S-words could be actionably indecent, even if the word was used only once.”33
During the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, Bono, upon winning an award 
for Best Original Song, hollered emphatically, “this is really, really f***ing bril-
liant.”34  Initially the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau deemed the comment not 
indecent because the use of the word did not describe in “context, sexual or 
excretory organs or activities and . . . the utterance was fleeting and isolated.”35 
The full Commission reversed the staff ruling and deemed that the F-word “is 
one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the 
English language,”36 even when used in a fleeting and nondescriptive manner.37
The FCC acknowledged that prior Commission and staff actions did not 
consider isolated or fleeting use of the F-word as indecent and actionable, but 
explicitly ruled that “any such interpretation is no longer good law.”38  This 
ruling became known as the Golden Globes Order.
During the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, Cher stated, “I’ve also had crit-
ics for the last forty years saying that I was on my way out every year.  Right. 
So f*** ’em.”  During the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, Nicole Richie asked 
the audience, referring to her Fox television show, “Why do they even call it 
The Simple Life?  Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada purse? 
It’s not so f***ing simple.”39
In 2006, the FCC released Notices of Apparent Liability for these two 
incidents and several others.  It did not assess fines; however, Fox appealed the 
notice, claiming that the Golden Globe Order should not apply.  The network 
argued that the FCC changed its policy without reasoned explanation and was 
“arbitrary or capricious” in its enforcement, and that the order violated the 
network’s First Amendment rights.40  The FCC responded that “both broad-
32 In the Matter of Industry Guidance On the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. 7999, 8002 
(2001).
33 In the Matter of Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Air-
ing of The “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C. Rcd. 4975, 4980 (2004) [herein-
after Golden Globes Order]. 
34 Id. at 4975–76.
35 Id. at 4976.
36 Id. at 4979.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 4980.
39 Fox I, supra note 25, at 510.
40 Id. at 516.
66 UCLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 26:59
casts under review would have been actionably indecent under the staff rulings 
and Commission dicta in effect prior to the Golden Globes Order.”41
This appeal became Fox I, the first influential Supreme Court Case on 
the Golden Globe Order.  Fox argued that the narrow scope of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Pacifica would prohibit the broadening of the FCC policy 
on indecency, but the Court stated that “we have never held that Pacifica rep-
resented the outer limits of permissible regulation.”42  The Court found that 
the Commission’s new enforcement policy was neither arbitrary nor capricious 
and that the reasons for expanding the scope of its enforcement policies of 
indecency were entirely rational.43  The Court in Fox I also pointed out that 
“technological advances have made it easier for broadcasters to bleep out 
offending words[,] further support[ing] the Commission’s stepped up enforce-
ment policy,” suggesting that violators are able to police themselves and that 
sanctions may be warranted if they do not.44
However, the Court in Fox I refused to address the First Amendment 
issue and remanded that back to the Second Circuit.  The Court pointed out it 
is the court of “final review, ‘not of first view.’” 45
Even though the two incidents involving Cher and Nicole Richie did not 
result in fines for Fox, the network was concerned the reprimand would hurt 
its reputation within the industry and with advertisers.  ABC was also cited 
and fined by the FCC for showing the bare buttocks and a side view of actress 
Charlotte Ross’s breast on a 2003 episode of NYPD Blue for approximately 
seven seconds.46
The Supreme Court did eventually address the First Amendment con-
cerns brought up in Fox I in its 2012 Fox II decision.  The Second Circuit 
previously found the entire FCC policy vague and thus unconstitutional.47  The 
appeals court found the policy “failed to give broadcasters sufficient notice of 
what would be considered indecent.”48  After analyzing several Commission 
rulings, the appeals court found the policy inconsistent because on occasion, 
the Commission found the “fleeting use of those words not indecent pro-
vided they occurred during a bona fide news interview or were ‘demonstrably 
essential to the nature of an artistic or educational work.’”49  The court found 
that there was ample evidence that the policy forced broadcasters to 
choose between not airing controversial programs or risk massive fines and 
41 Id. at 512.
42 Id. at 522.
43 Id. at 517.
44 Id. at 518.
45 Id. at 529.
46 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 567 U.S. 239, 247 (2012) [hereinafter Fox II].
47 Id. at 242.
48 Id. at 244.
49 Id.
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jeopardizing their licenses.  This hard choice, the Second Circuit found, had led 
to a chill in the exercise of protected speech rights.50
Justice Kennedy, writing for an 8–0 majority (Justice Sotomayor 
abstained) upheld the Second Circuit decision in these three incidents.  How-
ever, the Court stated that this decision was narrow in scope because it was 
decided on fair-notice grounds under the Due Process Clause and the Court 
chose not to address the First Amendment implications, letting the Second Cir-
cuit ruling stand.51
As of this writing, the FCC Guidelines on Obscene, Indecent and Profane 
Broadcasts state: 
The FCC has defined broadcast indecency as “language or material that, 
in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory organs or activities.”  Indecent programming contains patently 
offensive sexual or excretory material that does not rise to the level of 
obscenity.  The courts hold that indecent material is protected by the First 
Amendment and cannot be banned entirely.  FCC rules prohibit indecent 
speech on broadcast radio and television between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., when 
there is reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.52
III. Attempted Governmental Regulation of Online Content
A. The Act of 1996
The Communications Decency Act (CDA), part of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act), criminally prohibited the transmitting, 
by a telecommunications device, any obscene or indecent material to anyone 
under eighteen years of age.   Further, the CDA prohibited the use of an inter-
active computer service to transmit communications that, in context, depict or 
describe, in terms “patently offensive” as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.53
These sections of the CDA were challenged before the Supreme Court 
in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.54  In a 7–2 decision, the Court ruled 
that the “indecent transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions 
violated the First Amendment ,as the regulations amounted to content-based 
blanket restrictions.55
50 Id. at 252.
51 Id. at 257.
52 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Consumer Guide: Obscene, Profane and Indecent Broad-
casts (2017), https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and- profane-
broadcasts [https://perma.cc/24GQ-2F2C].
53 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996) (amended by the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 652, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
54 Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
55 Id.
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B. Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA)
In response to the Reno decision concerning the CDA, Congress passed 
the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) on October 21, 1998.56  COPA applied 
only to content for “commercial purposes,” unlike the CDA, and targeted por-
nography on the Internet by prohibiting material that is harmful to minors, as 
measured by contemporary community standards.  While COPA applied to 
significantly less material than the CDA, COPA, like the challenged provisions 
of the CDA, was eventually struck down by the courts as well.57
C. Ashcroft and the American Civil Liberties Union
At issue in Ashcroft 2002 was whether the government’s reliance on con-
temporary community standards to determine whether material on the World 
Wide Web was harmful to minors violated the First Amendment.58  In an 8–1 
decision, the Court held COPA’s reliance on community standards to identify 
material that was harmful to minors did not, by itself, render COPA facially 
overbroad or in violation of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court remanded Ashcroft back to the Third Circuit, 
which deemed COPA unconstitutional, holding that the Act was substantially 
overbroad in failing to serve a compelling government interest.59  It placed 
“significant burdens on Web publishers’ communication of speech that is con-
stitutionally protected as to adults . . . .  In so doing, COPA encroaches upon 
a significant amount of protected speech beyond that which the Government 
may target constitutionally in preventing children’s exposure to material that 
is obscene for minors.”60  The Supreme Court agreed to revisit the COPA case.
In a 5–4 decision in 2004, the Supreme Court held that the Third Circuit 
was correct to prohibit the enforcement of COPA because it violates the First 
Amendment.61  The district court’s primary reason for granting the initial pre-
liminary injunction had been the proposal by the plaintiffs that filtering and 
blocking software is a less restrictive alternative to the statute, and the govern-
ment had not shown it would disprove the plaintiffs’ contention at trial.  The 
Supreme Court found that found that blocking and filtering software is a less 
restrictive means of curbing children’s access to harmful material on the Inter-
net.  Thus, the Court found government had not shown that there are no “less 
restrictive alternatives” to COPA, and that there was a potential for extraordi-
nary harm and a serious chilling of protected speech if the law went into effect. 
The Court remanded the case back to the lower courts.
56 Child Online Protection Act,  47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
57 See Ashcroft 2002, 535 U.S. at 564; Ashcroft 2004, 542 U.S. at 656; Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 
2d at 775; Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 181.
58 Ashcroft 2002, 535 U.S. at 564.
59 Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 240.
60 Id. at 276.
61 Ashcroft 2004, 542 U.S. at 656.
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In a matter of two years, the Supreme Court went from a nearly unani-
mous decision (8–1 in Ashcroft 2002) to a split decision (5–4 in Ashcroft 2004) 
on this issue.  The Court, between the Ashcroft cases, had decided a case cen-
tering on regulating content in public libraries.  Filtering and blocking software 
was at the heart of the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) and U.S. v. 
American Library Association, decided in 2003, in which the Court responded 
favorably to the filtering technology discussed in the Ashcroft cases.62
In ACLU v. Gonzales, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania found that COPA violated the First Amendment and issued a 
permanent injunction against the enforcement of COPA.63  The district court 
found that COPA was not narrowly tailored to a compelling government inter-
est and that the statute was impermissibly vague and overbroad.  The court 
also noted that the U.S. Attorney General failed to meet his burden of show-
ing that COPA is the least restrictive and most effective means of achieving 
the compelling interest.64  Once again the United States appealed the district 
court’s decision.
The Third Circuit upheld the district court’s decision that COPA violated 
the First Amendment since it was not the most effective means of achieving 
the compelling interest of keeping children from visiting certain websites.65 
Attorney General Michael Mukasey appealed to the Supreme Court, but his 
petition was denied.66  After defending COPA for over ten years, the Justice 
Department was defeated.
D. Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
CIPA was enacted by Congress in 2000 to address concerns about access 
to the Internet and other platforms in schools and libraries.67  CIPA required 
schools to adopt a policy of monitoring online activities of minors.  Also, it 
required schools and libraries to adopt policies addressing (1) access by minors 
to inappropriate content; (2) the safety and security of minors when using elec-
tronic mail, chat rooms, and other forms of direct electronic communications; 
(3) unauthorized access; (4) unauthorized disclosure, use, and dissemination of 
personal information regarding minors; and (5) restrictions on minors’ access 
to material harmful to them.  CIPA did not require the tracking of Internet 
use by adults or minors.  Finally, under CIPA, schools and libraries would not 
receive the discounts offered by the “E-Rate” program (telephone discounts 
that make Internet access more affordable to schools and libraries) unless they 
62 Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763  (2000); Am. Li-
brary Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 194.
63 Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 775.
64 Id.
65 Mukasey, 534 F.3d at 181.
66 Id.
67 Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
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certify that they have certain Internet safety measures in place.  These mea-
sures include a way to block or filter pictures that are obscene and contain 
pornography.68
On May 31, 2002, CIPA was unanimously ruled unconstitutional by the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The three-judge panel 
held that the statute was unconstitutional because the mandated use of block-
ing or filtering technology on all computers would result in blocked access to 
substantial amounts of constitutionally protected speech.  The court found that 
public libraries can—and many do—use the following less restrictive alterna-
tives: filters offered as a choice for parents to use for their own children at the 
public library, education and Internet training courses, enforcement of Internet 
use policies, and placement of terminals, use of privacy screens or utilization of 
recessed monitors.69
In June 2003, the Supreme Court upheld CIPA in a 6–3 decision, deciding 
not only that it is constitutional for public libraries to install filtering software, 
but that if libraries did not they would lose funding.  The Court held that (1) 
Internet access in public libraries was neither a traditional nor a designated 
public forum; (2) forum analysis and precise judicial scrutiny were incompat-
ible with public libraries’ expansive discretion to consider content in making 
collection decisions; (3) any concerns over filtering software’s alleged ten-
dency to erroneously “overblock” access to constitutionally protected speech 
were dispelled by the ease with which library patrons could disable the filter-
ing software; (4) Congress could reasonably impose limitations on its Internet 
assistance program because public libraries normally excluded pornographic 
material from their collections; (5) filters did not violate the First Amendment 
rights of library patrons; and (6) CIPA was an appropriate exercise of Con-
gress’s spending power and did not impose an unconstitutional burden on 
public libraries that received federal assistance for Internet access.70
In 2011, the Protecting Children in the Twenty-First Century Act Amend-
ment was added to CIPA.  The amendment required schools to educate minors 
about appropriate online behavior, including “interacting with other indi-
viduals on social networking websites and in chat rooms, and cyberbullying 
awareness and response.”71
E. Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002
In yet another effort to keep children safe online, Congress passed the 
Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, which established a 
68 Id.
69 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 194.
70 Id.
71 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Consumer Guide: Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(CIPA) (2015), https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/1998/nrcb8003.
html [https://perma.cc/GZ7V-8P7R].
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children’s section of the Internet, comparable to a children’s section of the 
library, where children would be safe from pornography, pedophiles, and vio-
lence.  The act created a new, second-level Internet domain within the United 
States country code domain, .kids.us, which would only be available to those 
websites the content of which is suitable for minors.72
The guidelines for the new domain outlined five existing standards that 
would be applied: (1) compliance with existing laws, regulations, relevant vol-
untary standards; (2) indecency standards for the airwaves; (3) the Children’s 
Television Act of 1990 educational broadcasting requirements; (4) a privacy 
standard in compliance with COPA;73 and (5) compliance with the advertising 
standards set by the Children’s Advertising Unit.74
Dot Kids had limited success as there was little awareness of the program 
or its features.75  On July 27, 2012, the domain space was suspended indefinitely.
IV. Results and Analysis
This Article, through a comparative analysis, will examine the FCC’s 
broadcast regulations and its online regulations to determine how indecency 
standards are applied in both media and whether there is common ground.
The first question is whether the same regulatory arguments could be 
equally applied to broadcast radio and television and the Internet.  The courts 
accepted those regulatory arguments that suggest the least restrictive means 
of protecting children from indecent content on broadcast radio, television, 
and the Internet.  Except CIPA, content regulation on the Internet tends to 
lean towards the marketplace approach.  For example, the stringent regula-
tory measures suggested by the CDA and COPA did not pass constitutional 
muster because they were overbroad.  The amount of speech restricted under 
the CDA and COPA was more than what was needed to promote the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting children from harmful material on the Internet. 
CIPA, on the other hand, was accepted by the Court.  CIPA offers and man-
dates filtering software as a means of blocking out or controlling harmful 
material, and since the filters could be disabled if patrons asked librarians to 
disable them, the control of content was put in the hands of the consumer, not 
72 See Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 
2766 (2002); Alice G. McAfee, Creating Kid-Friendly Web Space: A Playground Model 
for Internet Regulation, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 201, 201–24 (2003).
73 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006).  COPPA 
was designed to protect the privacy of children who use the internet.  COPPA also re-
quired web sites to collect a credit card number or other proof of age before allowing 
internet users to view material deemed “harmful to minors.”
74 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-317, 116 Stat. 2766 
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75 Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protection Children Online, 
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the government.  The application of CIPA was also limited to public libraries 
and schools.
Broadcast radio and television are subjected to more content regulation 
than the Internet.  The courts accepted those arguments for broadcast regula-
tion that followed the public interest approach.  The FCC fought for a more 
restrictive safe harbor that allowed indecent material for only six hours per 
day on commercial stations and two hours per day for noncommercial stations 
that ended their broadcast day at midnight; however, the courts mandated the 
Commission adopt a uniform safe harbor for both commercial and noncom-
mercial stations.  The courts found that allowing indecent material from 10:00 
p.m. to 6:00 a.m.—the uniform safe harbor—would not jeopardize the public 
interest, nor would it infringe upon the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.
The Supreme Court in Fox I found that the reasoned evolution of FCC 
guidelines was acceptable, but in Fox II, the Court upheld an appellate court 
decision that the application of the existing guidelines was too vague for broad-
casters to know if they were in violation.
With regard to the question of whether the arguments are equally appli-
cable to broadcasting and the Internet, the answer is yes and no.  The courts 
accepted arguments for broadcasting that resembled a public interest approach, 
but for the Internet, accepted arguments that included public interest and mar-
ketplace approaches.  There is a component of both approaches in the current 
regulatory scheme for the Internet.
One argument that is applied equally to broadcast radio and television 
and to the Internet is the prohibition of blanket content-based restrictions of 
speech to protect children from indecent content.  The Supreme Court struck 
down the CDA and COPA because the statutes were overbroad.  The First 
Amendment rights of adults would have been violated under the two statutes. 
The courts recognized that indecent material qualifies for First Amendment 
protection regardless of merit.  The court also noted that even though such 
material may have a negative impact on children, adults still have a right 
to access it.
Another argument equally applied is channeling.  Channeling has been 
accepted by the courts as a less restrictive means of regulating indecency 
regulation both in broadcast and on the Internet.  The courts accepted the gov-
ernment’s public interest arguments and upheld channeling to protect children 
from indecent content.  The courts also noted, in the Actions for Children’s 
Television cases, that channeling does not infringe upon the rights of adults 
to indecent content online or over the airwaves.  Before the Internet, filter-
ing software, and the V-Chip, the government could only apply channeling to 
broadcast radio and television.  But now, the Internet and the V-Chip offer new 
means of channeling to protect children from indecent content.  CIPA and kids.
us are examples of channeling on the Internet.  CIPA mandates Internet filters 
on computers in libraries and schools so that indecent content is channeled 
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away from children.  Content that is deemed appropriate for children could be 
channeled to kids.us, though it is not a government mandate.  The concept of 
channeling was first introduced in Pacifica, eighteen years before the V-Chip 
was mandated in the 1996 Telecom Act.  The V-Chip allows parents to channel 
indecent content away from children.  While it is mandated by the government 
to be installed by television manufacturers, parents are not required to use it.
With the equivalencies in broadcast and Internet regulation established, 
the next question is the direction broadcast and Internet policy should take with 
developing technologies.  In response to the changing technological landscape, 
Congress passed the Telecom Act in 1996.  The convergence of telecommuni-
cations, computing, and traditional media in a digital world necessitated the 
modernization and reconstruction of the regulatory framework surrounding 
mass media.  Part of the Telecom Act was the creation of V-chip technology. 
The V-chip fulfills the requirements of Section 551 of the act, which requires 
the FCC to determine whether video programming distributors “(1) have 
established acceptable voluntary rules for rating video programming that con-
tains sexual, violent or other indecent material about which parents should 
be informed before it is displayed to children and; (2) have agreed voluntarily 
to broadcast signals that contain such ratings.”76  The Child Safe Viewing Act, 
passed in 2008, instructed the FCC to take another look at the V-chip and 
other existing blocking technologies that parents could use to protect children 
from objectionable video or audio programming across devices.77  The act only 
required the Commission to explore available technologies, not make policy 
regarding such content regulation.  With the implementation of the act and 
the losing streak in the courts, it seems that Congress has given up the fight for 
additional content regulation legislation and realized that more regulation is 
not necessary in a technologically advanced society.
The FCC agreed.  In April 2001, the Commission issued a policy state-
ment, Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 
U.S.C. §  1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency.78 
Then-Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth wrote: “Today, the video market-
place is rife with an abundance of programming, distributed by several types of 
content providers.”79  He also wrote, “[i]n my judgment, as alternative sources 
of programming and distribution increase, broadcast content restrictions must 
76 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Record, GN 98-3, Commission Finds Industry Video Pro-
gramming Rating System Acceptable (1998), https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/
News_Releases/1998/nrcb8003.html [https://perma.cc/2AZ6-88NP].
77 Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-452, 122 Stat. 5025 (2008). 
78 Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Record, FCC 01-90, Industry Guidance on the Commis-
sion’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. §  1464 and Enforcement Policies Regard-
ing Broadcast Indecency (2001), https://www.fcc.gov/document/industry-guidance- 
commissions-case-law-interpreting-18-usc-section-1464-and-enforcement [https://perma.
cc/5M9J-UZB3].
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be eliminated.”  He concluded with the following: “Technology, especially dig-
ital communications, has advanced to the point where broadcast deregulation 
is not only warranted, but long overdue.”80
The Supreme Court also addressed technological regulatory measures as 
less restrictive in several cases.  In ACLU v. Reno in 2000, the Third Circuit, in 
affirming the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction against 
COPA, recognized that due to technological limitations there might not be 
other means by which harmful material on the Internet and World Wide Web 
would be constitutionally restricted.81
In ACLU v. Ashcroft in 2003, the appellate court examined the use of 
blocking and filtering software as a less restrictive alternative.  The district 
court noted, as did the appellate court, that blocking and filtering technology 
may not be perfect, but it appeared to be a logical alternative and, at the very 
least, as effective as the COPA statute.82
In Ashcroft 2004, the Supreme Court once again heard arguments con-
cerning COPA.  The Court noted the changes in the technological landscape 
since the first COPA case, ACLU v. Reno in 1997.  The Court wrote the following:
Since the passage of COPA, Congress has enacted additional laws regulating 
the Internet in an attempt to protect minors.  For example, it has enacted a 
prohibition on misleading Internet domain names, in order to prevent Web 
site owners from disguising pornographic Web sites in a way likely to cause 
uninterested persons to visit them.  It has also passed a statute creating a 
“Dot Kids” second-level Internet domain, the content of which is restricted 
to that which is fit for minors under the age of 13.83
In Ashcroft 2004, the Court supported filters as a less restrictive means 
than the statute at issue.  The Court said that promoting the use of filters nearly 
eliminates the potential chilling effect because filters do not condemn as crim-
inal a category of speech.  In addition, the Court said that filters may be more 
effective than COPA.  For instance, filters can be applied to all forms of online 
communications, like email, not just those communications available via the 
Web.  The Commission on Child Online Protection, a blue-ribbon commission 
enacted by Congress in the COPA statute, confirmed that filtering software 
may very well be more effective than COPA.  The Commission found that 
filters are more effective than age-verification requirements.  The Court in 
Ashcroft 2004 pointed out that the government-appointed commission con-
cluded the opposite of the government’s argument favoring the COPA statute 
over filter and blocking software.  Finally, the Court noted that the factual 
record did not reflect the current technological reality, a serious flaw in any 
case involving the Internet because “the technology of the Internet evolves 
80 Id. at 23.
81 Reno, 217 F.3d at 166, 172.
82 Ashcroft, 322 F.3d at 240.
83 Ashcroft 2004, 542 U.S. at 663.
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at a rapid pace.”84  The Court acknowledged that five years had passed since 
COPA was first argued and technology had since changed greatly.  The case 
was remanded with instructions for the district court to take account of the 
changed legal landscape and supplement the factual record to reflect current 
technological realities.85
Filtering software was also at the heart of the CIPA statute and American 
Library Association,86 in which the Supreme Court upheld CIPA, endorsing 
the statute’s approach to Internet access in schools and libraries.  The Court 
said that any concerns over filtering and blocking software’s alleged tendency 
to wrongly “overblock” access to constitutionally protected speech were dis-
missed by the ease with which library patrons could have the software disabled. 
Hence, public libraries’ use of Internet filtering software does not violate their 
patrons’ First Amendment rights.
Future regulatory approaches for both broadcast and the Internet should 
take a marketplace approach.  The government should use current technol-
ogy, such as the V-chip and Internet filtering and blocking software, to protect 
children from indecent content on the airwaves and the Internet, rather than 
impose further regulation.  This technology allows the consumer, not the gov-
ernment, to make their own content choices.
Conclusion
For over a decade, Congress has attempted to impose content-based reg-
ulations on the Internet via the CDA, COPA, and CIPA.  Only CIPA survived 
constitutional scrutiny.  CIPA is the closest the courts have come to permitting 
content regulation on the Internet.  The result of the CIPA case (American 
Library Association) was unexpected, as the Supreme Court had struck down 
other content-based statutes related to the Internet in Reno v. ACLU in 1997, 
Ashcroft 2002, and Ashcroft 2004.87
It was not until 2007 in ACLU v. Gonzales, four years after the CIPA 
case, that filters were finally acknowledged to be a less restrictive alternative to 
government regulation.88  The district court noted that filters are available to 
everyone, and that many Internet service providers provide filters at no extra 
cost.  The court also noted that in addition to content filtering capabilities, fil-
tering products have additional tools to help parents control their children’s 
Internet activities.  Finally, the court noted that filtering products block Web 
pages originating not only in the United States, but also outside the U.S.89 
While filters are not a completely foolproof means to protect children from 
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inappropriate content and activities online, they are the most effective and 
least restrictive means to serve Congress’s compelling interest.  And as noted 
in CIPA, filters would not infringe the First Amendment rights of adults as 
COPA would have.
The government has taken some proactive legislative measures with stat-
utes such as the Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, which 
created kids.us for Internet content that is suitable for children.90  Whether an 
Internet publisher chose to put their website on kids.us was strictly voluntary. 
The government simply created a new place for children on the Internet, a 
form of channeling, and a tool for parental monitoring.  Congress passes laws 
that are in the public interest, and kids.us protected the public interest by pro-
viding a safe area on the Internet and World Wide Web for children.  However, 
this effort was met with limited success, and the site was suspended indefi-
nitely in 2012.
While the issue of regulating indecent or harmful speech online has 
become more settled, the FCC continues to employ vague language in its 
policy for obscene and indecent broadcasts.  Its policy raises two questions. 
First, how does one define “contemporary community standards for the broad-
cast medium”?  A network broadcast would include the entire United States, 
and the Supreme Court has noted in obscenity rulings that community stan-
dards vary throughout the country.
COPA drew on the three-part obscenity test from Miller v. California 
requiring jurors to apply “contemporary community standards” in assessing 
material.91  The Supreme Court held in Ashcroft 2002 that COPA’s reliance on 
contemporary standards does not by itself render the statute substantially over-
broad for First Amendment purposes.  However, the Court expressed no view 
as to whether the statute suffered from substantial overbreadth for reasons 
other than its use of community standards, whether the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague, or whether COPA survived strict scrutiny.  With the exception 
of Justice Stevens, the justices favored a national standard with respect to the 
Internet.92  But the issue has not been addressed since the Warren Court and 
the Miller decision.  Miller, a decision made over forty years ago, has been the 
standard by which obscenity cases are decided and may be showing its age. 
Back in 1973, the standard applied to media that differ in a fundamental way 
from the Internet and World Wide Web.  yet no one is willing to admit that 
the Miller test is out of date.  With rapid technological advances, the old laws 
of the previous century seem obsolete.  If there must be regulation, it should 
be applicable to today’s media.  For instance, when cable television boomed in 
the 1980s, the FCC regulated as needed with the Cable Communications Policy 
90 Dot Kids Implementation and Efficiency Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-317 (2002).
91 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
92 Ashcroft 2002, 535 U.S. at 585–90.
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Act of 1984.  It did not apply broadcast standards to a medium that was clearly 
distinct from free over-the-air broadcast television.
In regard to a national standard, the parties in Ashcroft 2002 disputed the 
nature of the community standards that jurors would be instructed to apply 
when assessing whether works appeal to the prurient interest of minors and 
are patently offensive with respect to minors.  The respondents contended that 
jurors would evaluate material using their local community standards.93  But 
communities on the Internet do not have geographic borders.  Though most of 
the justices favored a national standard, they were not sure how to apply it to 
the Internet.94
If a national “community standard” is defined, then jurors would have to 
be instructed to apply the standard in relevant cases.  Obviously, national jury 
instructions would have to be written specifically for the national standard.
Second, the FCC guidelines state: “In making obscenity, indecency and 
profanity determinations, context is key.  The FCC staff must analyze what was 
actually aired, the meaning of what was aired and the context in which it was 
aired.”  But how does one define “context?”  One could argue this uncertainty 
still leaves networks without a clear idea of what is considered indecent.
Ultimately, there remain fundamental differences between the regula-
tions applied to Internet content and those applied to the traditional broadcast 
media.  Broadcast radio and television are regulated via the public interest 
approach.  Channeling provides some leeway for indecent content on the 
airwaves.  The eight-hour safe harbor offers a mild compromise to previous 
suggestions of a twenty-four-hour ban and six-hour ban of indecent content 
over the airwaves.  Future regulatory approaches for both broadcast radio and 
television should take more of a marketplace approach.  Instead of impos-
ing further regulation, the government should use existing technology, such 
as the V-Chip and Internet filters, as a means of channeling to protect chil-
dren from indecent content on the airwaves and online.  For the Internet, the 
Supreme Court thought that filters and blocking software were adequate for 
public libraries and schools.  That sentiment resonated with lower courts, which 
acknowledged that filters are adequate in private homes.  The online commu-
nity has consistently shunned government attempts to regulate content on the 
Internet.  The regulation proposed by the U.S. government for the Internet 
would have destroyed much of the Internet’s value, not just by limiting the 
freedom of Internet users to express themselves, but also by trying to impose 
a regulating structure on the entire Internet.  For both broadcast and Inter-
net-based media, technology such as filters and the V-chip can allow adequate 
protection of minors while preserving the First Amendment rights of the public.
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